A new report on the August 30 incident in which six nuclear-armed
advanced cruise missiles were effectively "lost" for
36 hours, during which time they were, against all regulations,
flown in launch position mounted on a pylon on the wing of a
B-52H Stratofortress, from Minot AFB in North Dakota across
the continental US to Barksdale AFB in Louisiana, has left unanswered
some critical questions about the event.
Directed by retired Air Force Gen. Larry D. Welch, the task
force's Report on the Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons
found plenty wrong with the way the US military handles its
nuclear weapons, but appears to have dealt lightly with the
specific incident that sparked the inquiry-only giving it a
few paragraphs.
According to the report, when nuclear-capable missiles are
placed onto a pylon assembly (in the case of the B-52, these
pylons can hold six missiles), procedures call for a clear distinction
to be made as to whether they are armed with nuclear weapons
or with dud warheads. In the storage bunker, pylons with dud
warheads are supposed to be encircled with orange cones like
those used by highway repair crews, and placards announcing
that the warheads are duds are supposed to be hung on all four
sides. This reportedly was not done, leaving no distinction
between one pylon containing six nuclear-armed missiles, and
two others that had missiles carrying nukes.
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A second failure was in record keeping. According to regulations
for handling nuclear weapons, every step in moving a nuke requires
written verification and manual checking. When the weapons were
taken from storage racks and installed on the missiles, there
should have been written records, including the serial numbers
of each warhead. When a breakout crew moved the nuclear-armed
missiles on the pylon and passed it to a convoy crew for removal
from the storage bunker to the airfield for mounting on the
plane, there was supposed to be a visual verification of the
warheads by the convoy crew, and another written record of the
transfer of ownership. When the convoy crew handed over the
pylon to the crew chief for mounting on the plane, there was
supposed to be another warhead verification check by the crew
chief and another written record. Finally, the aircrew was required
to verify the payload, warhead by warhead.
Reportedly, none of these steps were taken. In other words,
there was a failure to check the payloads of the missiles not
just once but at every step of the way-an astounding breakdown
in controls and procedures, which at a minimum suggests that
the US nuclear arsenal is as vulnerable to theft, extortion
and nefarious misuse as those in the former Soviet Union or
in Pakistan-not a pleasant thought.
A third failure, more systemic, which was identified in this
latest report, was a general decline-even a breakdown-in the
decades-long tradition of high standards and professionalism
in the US nuclear force itself. The Strategic Air Command, which
oversaw all nuclear equipment, has been eliminated, and command
and control of nuclear weapons have been integrated into the
regular forces, right down to the storage of nuclear devices
themselves, which are now routinely kept together with conventional
warheads-a recipe for disaster not just because of the kind
of confusion that allegedly led to the Aug. 30 incident, but
also because of the possibility of accidents in which a non-nuclear
device could detonate, scattering nuclear debris. Furthermore,
the report documents that the nuclear force, once a prime career
choice for advancement-minded military professionals, has become
a dumping ground for mediocrity-a place where military personnel
go to be forgotten. Pilots of B-52s, for example, no longer
even get nuclear certified-so unlikely is it that they will
be called upon to fly nuclear missions, the report states.
The report is a catalog of failure and ineptitude, and should
lead to a complete overhaul. But it is also failure itself.
This is because as disastrous as the picture it paints of America's
nuclear forces and handling procedures may be, the report also
ignores the big questions that remain about the recent incident
which led to the Welch investigation in the first place. Primary
among these questions is why, if all the various teams that
handled the six nuclear-tipped Advanced Cruise Missiles up at
Minot, from the guards and handlers in the storage bunker to
the pilots, failed to note that the warheads on the missiles
were nukes, was the ground crew that went out onto the tarmac
to service the plane after it landed at Barksdale able to spot
them and identify them as nukes almost immediately upon arriving
at the plane?
After all, the personnel at Minot knew they were handling weapons
in a bunker, and coming from a bunker, that stored nuclear weapons,
and so should have been on alert to the possibility. The crew
at Barksdale, however, had absolutely no reason to expect nuclear
weapons. Not only was the delivery of these cruise missiles
to Barksdale part of a long, on-going routine process of ferrying
the obsolete weapons in for decommissioning and destruction.
In addition, for the last 40 years, it has been against military
rules to fly nuclear weapons over domestic airspace except in
specially outfitted military cargo planes. That is to say, prior
to this incident no B-52 or other bomber has carried a nuclear
weapon in launch position over US territory since 1967!
Given that history, one has to assume that the warheads on
those six missiles on the pylon must have been literally screaming
out that they were nukes, for the ground crew to have noticed.
Surely Gen. Welch and his colleagues should have addressed
the question of why those Barksdale workers were so easily able
to spot the "mistake" while, allegedly, no one in
the chain of possession of the weapons at Minot managed to do
it.
The position of the report was clearly, from the start, that
this whole thing was a mistake. That is to say, it's conclusion
was foreordained. But we should know from the incredible, bald-faced
lie about the reason for shooting down a spy satellite last
week-that it posed an environmental and health threat because
of a relatively small 1000 lb. fuel tank containing toxic hydrazine
fuel that allegedly could make it to earth and then pose a health
threat-that Pentagon explanations are often dishonest, or deliberately
confusing. (Hyrdazine is no more dangerous than many toxic chemicals,
and for someone to seriously be put at risk, he or she would
have to walk up to the smoking tank after it hit earth, and
hang around the noxious vapours breathing them in for some time-something
few people would be likely to do. Moreover, the probability
of an explosive fuel tank making it through searing re-entry
to ground without bursting and releasing the material harmlessly
in the upper atmosphere was always negligeable. The explanation
for the $60-million missile shot was clearly a cover-up of a
Pentagon scheme to test its space-warfare capability without
having to admit what it was doing.)
Could the Minot nuke incident have been something other than
a mistake?
A careful reading of the Welch report-both what it says and
what it fails to say-has to leave that question unanswered.
Recall that back in August and September, the Bush/Cheney administration
was, as it is now, ratcheting up the talk about an attack on
Iran over its nuclear activities and over its alleged support
for insurgent attacks on American troops in Iraq. While the
military top brass, as well as the secretary of defense are
known, for the most part, to oppose such plans, there certainly
are some, particularly within the Air Force, who have a higher
opinion of the effectiveness of airpower,
Recall too that in the weeks and days prior to and immediately
following the Aug. 30 Minot nuke incident, no fewer than six
airmen associated with Minot, Barksdale and the B-52 fleet died
either in vehicle accidents or alleged suicides. One of the
two suicides involved a Minot airman whose job was guarding
the base's nuclear weapons storage facilities. The Welch report
doesn't even mention this strange cluster of deaths--none of
which has even been investigated by the military, according
to local police and medical examiners contacted.
Could someone at the top level of government-perhaps the Vice
President, who is particularly belligerent towards Iran-have
attempted to set up an alternative chain of command to "spring"
a few unaccounted for nukes for use in some kind of "false
flag" or rogue operation that, were it to succeed, could
set a war against Iran in motion? Barksdale AFB, it should be
noted, bills itself as the main staging base for B-52s being
sent overseas for Middle East duty.
The way the Aug. 30 incident came to light, which was thanks
to Air Force whistleblowers who contacted a reporter at the
Military Times newspaper publishing office-makes such an idea
seem at least plausible. Clearly, some uniformed personnel were
so upset at what happened that they were willing to risk their
military careers to go outside of the chain of command and alert
the public in the only way they knew how. Clearly too, they
were so distrustful of their superiors, right on up to the office
of the Secretary of Defense, that they did not consider taking
their information to anyone within the Pentagon.
Maybe it's asking too much to expect a retired general, tasked
to investigate this incident by the Secretary of Defense who
himself was appointed by the White House, to look into such
a theory, which after all if true would represent an act of
treason. And yet, the failure of this report to at least explore
the idea makes it into something of a cover-up.
The obvious answer here is that Congress should be holding
public hearings into the incident, and asking these tough questions.
Incredibly, this has not happened. The Democratic-led Congress,
here as in virtually every issue that has come before it (with
the exception of steroids in professional sports!), has ducked
its responsibility. In this case Congress has been content to
let Air Force officials, behind closed doors, offer them information
about the incident-which is a far cry from holding hearings
where the officers would be grilled under oath about what they
know.
Given this gutless and irresponsible behavior by legislators
who, I am sure, would be holding high-profile hearings had the
same kind of incident occurred in Russia, China, or Pakistan,
we are left having to hope that someone with real knowledge
of what happened at Minot will come forward and tell the story
to a reporter.
For the record, I'm ready and waiting, pen in hand